The Most Dangerous Moment
30 Squadron and the air battle over Colombo 5th April 1942.
By Wg Cdr John Barrass
The most dangerous moment of the War, and the one which caused me the greatest alarm, was when the Japanese Fleet was heading for Ceylon and the naval base there. The capture of Ceylon, the consequent control of the Indian Ocean, and the possibility at the same time of a German conquest of Egypt would have closed the ring and the future would have been black.
- Sir Winston Churchill
INTRODUCTION
The 5th April 1942 was one of the most significant events in the history of 30 Squadron - The Battle of Ceylon. Although the air battle over Colombo lasted only a few hours, it represents the finest example of the spirit, courage and determination of our wartime aircrew. Whilst recognising the courage and professionalism of the other RAF squadrons, especially the Catalina’s of 413 Squadron and the Fleet Air Arm, throughout the battle, this account focuses unashamedly on the exploits of 30 Squadron pilots on that day
THE STRATEGIC SITUATION IN APRIL 1942
The Battle of Britain was one of the most important military victories in History. By denying Germany the control of the air they needed to force a crossing of the English Channel, the RAF ensured Britain’s survival as, for a time, the sole opposition to German domination of Europe. But, as Churchill so eloquently put it, the Battle of Britain was only the “end of the beginning” of the War. The tide of war was to flow the way of Germany and her Axis partners for another 2 years.
By April 1942, conflict had spread to the Far East with the entry of Japan and the USA into the War. Buoyant with their success at Pearl Harbour, the Japanese had achieved unprecedented success in seizing Malaya and the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia). Japanese forces were close to victory against the Americans in the Philippines, and were advancing steadily into Burma. The Japanese 1st Air Strike Fleet had destroyed the remaining Far East Allied naval presence in the Java Sea, attacked Darwin, and was poised to enter the Indian Ocean unopposed. In North Africa, Rommel was making steady progress eastwards towards Egypt. If the Japanese were to seize Ceylon and control of the sea in the Indian Ocean, then the convoy routes carrying reinforcements to the Middle East, and bringing vital oil supplies from the Gulf, would be cut. There seemed to be a real possibility that within 6 months of Japan entering the War, the Axis powers would control the Middle and Near East, the Caucasus, India and South East Asia, along with all the vast raw materials they needed for an escalating war effort. The outlook for the Allies was grim, and the attention of British planning staffs focused on the defence of Ceylon, which was seen as the strategic centre of gravity.
The British Chiefs of Staff began to assemble forces to defend Ceylon. Two fighter squadrons (30 & 261) were transferred from the Middle East, along with a Catalina squadron (413), to bolster the air forces on the island, and a large fleet of mostly obsolete warships was assembled to form a new Eastern Fleet.
Economically, Japan had much to gain from further conquest in Southern Asia and was advancing quickly into Burma. However, she still had to consolidate her hold over Malaya and the East Indies, and had no immediate desire to invade Ceylon. Above all, to exploit the rich resources of Southern Asia, she needed to secure her sea lines of communication and that required complete domination of the Pacific. Admiral Nagumo’s fleet with its powerful complement of carriers was not ordered into the Indian Ocean to invade Ceylon, but to eliminate the threat posed by the Royal Navy presence in the Indian Ocean so that Japan’s full naval force could be directed against the US Navy in the South Pacific. Thus, rather ironically, the formation of the Eastern Fleet invited the very attack it was intended to deter.
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